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Bryan Gordon

Veblen’s Vested Interest and Power

Bryan Gordon

With this inquiry I shall seek to establish that Thorstein Veblen
advanced theories which related the vested interests with power. To
accomplish this I shall first dissect the meanings behind Veblen’s
definitions of “the vested interest”, “intangible assets” and “free
income.” I then, using the previous analysis relate the state to vested
interests and solidify their collective unity. After this connection I
proceed onto analyzing the implications of the vested interest and
how it relates to the common man. Power, normally analyzed within
the context of political science is rarely spoken of within economics,
this analysis strives to bring the idea of power into the realm of
economics through Thorstein Veblen’s work, The Vested Interest and
the Common Man [1919].
This inquiry seeks to establish that Thorstein Veblen advances
ideas regarding the vested interests as these relate to power. Veblen
(2013, 161) defines a vested interest as “a legitimate right to get
something for nothing.” However, what does it mean to get something
for nothing? Veblen (2013, 99) helps answer this question by
purporting that “Vested interests are immaterial wealth, intangible
assets.” Intangible assets, Veblen (2013, 169) teaches us, are the
“chief and ordinary indication of free income, that is to say, of getting
something for nothing.” Veblen (2013, 169) goes on to purport a
vested interest as having the “assured customary claim to get
something more in the way of income than a full equivalent for
tangible performance in the way of productive work.” Which, in my
view is the idea of getting something for nothing.
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To better explain this viewpoint, I need to expand on the
definitions for intangible assets and free income. To start, what
separates a tangible asset and an intangible one? Veblen (2013, 68)
proposes that tangible assets “represent the earning-capacity of any
mechanically productive property” and intangible assets “represent
assured income which cannot be assigned to any specific material
factor as its productive source.” Veblen (2013, 68) goes on to teach us
that the fundamental difference between tangible and intangible
assets, is that intangible assets arise from business relations as
opposed to industry. These business relations can be thought of, as
Veblen (2013, 68) it, “derived from advantages of salesmanship . . .”
This means that any assets or profits derived from salesmanship, such
as advertising, investment, market control, etc. are in fact intangible
assets.
This brings the inquiry to the analysis of free income and its
relation to intangible assets. To start, Veblen (2013, 71) teaches us
that free income is “supernumerary and preferential”, meaning that
the income gained is both in excess of what is needed and benefits
one party or group over another. This “preferential excess” is an
important concept when relating to intangible assets, and by extension
the vested interest, serving as a bridging point between the vested
interest and free income. As one would recall in the paper, a vested
interest has a legitimate claim to get more in the way of income than
would be equivalent for tangible performance in productive work. An
easier way to state this would be that a vested interest has a legitimate
claim to profit. However profit can be considered as preferential
excess as it is more gain than is necessary and it benefits one party
over another. Thus we can redefine the vested interests a final time: a
vested interest has a legitimate claim to preferential excess.
This redefining of the vested interests creates a powerful image,
one that promises to evoke thoughts on the motives of Big Business.
This implication borders intentional, as when Veblen wrote The
Vested Interests and the Common Man, the big business of his day
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was getting into full swing, Rockefeller’s Standard Oil and the U.S.
Steel Corporation being full blown monopolies in the day. Indeed,
Veblen (2013, 73-74) teaches us about the privileges monopolies
hold, specifically the ability to restrain trade by way of controlling the
output of goods or services. In my view, it would also be a very safe
assumption that any business that is sufficiently large shares a similar
level of privilege. Thus we have a good indicator that what Veblen
wrote on in the early 1900’s would still be an accurate representation
of the current situation.
However, the vested interests do not merely exist within the
confines of business, big or otherwise. Veblen (2013, 123) teaches us
that the vested interest was once known as the Divine Right of Kings
and that “It was of a proprietary nature, a vested interest, something in
the nature of intangible assets which embodied the usufruct of the
realm, including its population and resources, and which could be
turned to account in the pursuit of princely or dynastic advantages at
home and abroad.” This proprietary nature meant that the sovereign
state1 effectively had monopoly ownership over the land they ruled, as
long as it was within the rights of usufruct2. The nature of this
monopoly was one of preferential excess and indeed the claim to
sovereignty is considered a legitimate one when claimed by the state.
This allows for a relation of sovereignty, equating the power of
the state, to the vested interests of business. For this we must look at
intangible assets and free income again, to redefine them in context to
the state. When looking at intangible assets we can clearly see, from
my point of view, that rather than being derived from the advantages
of salesmanship, we observe a derivation from the advantages of
1

Sovereignty is derived from the Divine Right of Kings and, because of this
derivation, the sovereign state in this paper is equated to having the same vested
interest as the Divine Right of Kings because of this derivation.
2
Usufruct is the ancient Roman law that states one has the right to enjoy the
use and advantages of another’s property short of the destruction or waste of its
substance.

95

Anthós, Vol. VI, Issue 1
sovereignty. Sovereignty, having the advantage of being considered
legitimate by the majority, has by definition, the power and legitimate
claim to vie for its preferential excess.
This brings us back to the idea of free income; getting something
for nothing. However, what more can a state gain within its borders?
The answer is, if it is sovereign it has nothing to gain, as within its
borders it is a monopoly. So how does a sovereign state gain
preferential excess? It accomplishes this by one of two ways, first, it
can conquer nations with less military prowess and second, it can
protect and further domestic vested interests. The first method of
preferential excess, conquering nations, is universally frowned upon
today and only done indirectly (annexation), if at all. However, this
method was once quite popular, as could be seen with colonialism
during Veblen’s time. Which Veblen (2013, 129) wrote about, stating
“There still are conferences, stipulations and guarantees between the
Powers, touching the “Open Door” in China, or the equitable partition
of Africa, which read like a chapter on Honor among Thieves.”
The second is similar, however the playing field is altered.
Nations now move about the globe as they can, quote on quote
“protecting their interests” as it is often said, and when attacking a
foreign state, it is not a violation of sovereignty, rather the invading
state is protecting interests, helping out the locals or seeking justice
upon an attacker. They are all buzzwords, a nation protecting their
interests in a foreign country either means the nation has some
strategic value (as with the Crimea) or economic value (as with Saudi
Arabia). A nation helping out locals is priming an economy or state to
become an allied interest, and a nation seeking justice upon an
attacker is looking for an excuse to remove an enemy (as with
Saddam Hussein). To put this into the terms of business, Veblen
(2013, 130) forwards the notion that traders and investors to foreign
nations are able to net a larger profit in their ventures if their national
government is powerful, aggressive, unscrupulous and overbearing,
which can be expected if the government is administered by those of
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the vested interests. However in the case of businesses and nations,
the invading government eventually leaves, the old state’s sovereignty
intact, albeit in name only.
But if a government cannot resort to justified force and will not
resort to unjustified force, how does it aid the vested interests to
increase its preferential excess? Veblen (2013, 132) only addressed
the usage of tariff barriers to keep the price up and the supply down,
however, this is only one of several available levers of power.
Economic sanctions have become a powerful tool in the arsenal of the
vested interests who sway the state for their benefit. These economic
sanctions can be tariffs, but they also include embargos, asset freezes,
and other methods which serve to isolate an economy. These
economic sanctions are often considered ineffective in the realm of
changing a foreign state’s policy, but are brutally effective at
removing an economy not operating by the rules laid forth by the
vested interests from the world at large. However, there is another
tool in the arsenal of the state swayed by vested interests, preferential
treatment. This preferential treatment is the opposite of economic
sanction, indeed, trade is opened up to an even greater degree, tariffs
are lowered or even removed and life is good for the allies of the
nation swayed by the vested interests.
A final line of questioning remains- how do the vested interests
affect the common man? Veblen (2013, 160) posits that “the
population of these civilized countries now falls into two main
classes…a division, not between those who have something and those
who have nothing…but between those who own wealth enough to
make it count and those who do not.” Veblen (2013, 161) goes on to
detail the class of wealth as being the “kept classes”, which include
not merely the vested interests of business, but the clergy, the nation3

3

Veblen in the text writes about “the Crown” instead of the nation/state. I use
nation or state instead of the Crown specifically for the reason nation or state is a
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and the agents of the nation, military and civil. These kept classes are
the class that has enough wealth or rather, preferential excess, to
count. The other class, the one which does not have the wealth or
preferential excess to count, is the realm of the common man. But
what does it mean to “count”? Since preferential excess comes from
intangible assets and is tied directly to vested interests, we can
determine that being a vested interest is what truly counts.
Why is this so? It is a function of power, the common man can
usually only get what he can get. Veblen (2013, 111) teaches us that
“A more powerful corporation is in a position to make its own terms
with greater freedom, which it then is for the workmen to take or
leave, but ordinarily to take.” Since it has already been established
that the state operates along similar lines as a corporation, it may not,
in my view, be a stretch to affirm that the kept classes in general
operate along similar lines of power. This means that the mass of
common men, who the workmen are a part of, do not have the ability
to make their own terms. Rather, they react to the terms of the kept
classes. Veblen (2013, 165) shows us that this affects farmers,
“caught between the vested interests who buy cheap and the vested
interests who sell dear” and that to not take what is offered results in
what Veblen (2013, 165) calls “getting left”4. Even the common
businessman cannot claim to be of the kept classes, only a middleman
for them, as Veblen (2013, 166) muses, “He still manages to sell dear,
but he does not commonly buy cheap, except what he buys of the
farmer, for the massive vested interests in the background now decide
for him…how much his traffic will bear.”

more relevant term for today and the nation or state is not much different from the
Crown described by Veblen.
4 I believe the concept of “getting left” refers to the idea that if you don’t
accept what is given to you, you get nothing instead.
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However, the common man is not without his own variant of the
vested interests. Veblen (2013, 164) describes the AF of L5 as not
being made up of members who could be counted among the kept
classes. Rather, the organization and its leadership collects income
from its underlying members, which is a form of free income.
Furthermore, it pursues the interests of the organization and seeks a
form of preferential excess over the common lot of men. In my view,
the preferential excess sought, is not one of dominance over others as
is with the kept classes, but rather a balancing of power with the kept
classes. However, Veblen (2013, 165) brings up the valid point—that
the vested interest which animates the A. F. of L.—may be “nothing
more to the point than an aimless survival.” Yet while this may be
true, it would be a shame not to include it in this analysis as it
provides a clear case that vested interests do always share the same
goals.
This inquiry has sought to establish that Thorstein Veblen
advanced ideas regarding the vested interest as they relate to power.
These vested interests are considered to have a legitimate claim to
something for nothing, or what has been referred to in the paper as
preferential excess. This redefinition is more accurate when applied to
the workings of power than when applied to the mechanics of
economics. It is ultimately the same definition in meaning, but uses
different language. This difference in language allows for the vested
interests of the divine right of kings or state, to more easily be
analyzed side by side with the vested interests of business. The
analysis between the two interests, causes a realization that they share
similar interests and conduct similar things for the benefit of one
another, these similarities are where the vested interest and its claim
to preferential excess relates to power. Yet it is within the analysis of
the common man that two classes emerge: the kept classes consisting
purely of the vested interests, and the common class.
5

The AF of L is the American Federation of Labor.
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The common man often has no choice to conform because he has
his own form of vested interest. This vested interest is different as
shown by the A.F. of L. It operates in such a way that those who
make up the vested interest are not themselves of the kept classes, but
rather still of the common lot. Yet the organization acts in the same
ways as a vested interest, by gaining the ability to counter the terms
which the kept classes impose upon them. This vested interest is by
far the most interesting, it is a vested interest with the common lot as
opposed to the kept classes, threatening to break the dichotomy
between the kept classes and the common lot. It is a terrible shame
Veblen did not have more examples of similar vested interests in his
book The Vested Interest and the Common Man, as it implies that
there is a counter power. Something which denies the power garnered
by vested interests and their claim to preferential excess. It is the hope
that future research by myself and others will fill the gap in
understanding, turning a hunch into elucidation.
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